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HOW ENGLAND SHOULD TREAT THE VANQUISHED BOERS.

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MUCH has been written on the history of the past and on the present in South Africa, but as yet there have been comparatively few attempts to forecast the best permanent arrangements to follow upon the conclusion of the present hostilities. I have been honored by a request to contribute to the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW a statement of my opinions on this complicated question. I gladly avail myself of the opportunity of submitting my views to the consideration of American readers, but I need hardly say that mine is not a prophetic soul. So far from being able to foretell the future of South Africa, I cannot even predict the probable duration of the present war. My belief is that the struggle in the Transvaal will be long, obstinate and sanguinary; that, unlike their more civilized and better informed brethren in the Orange Free State, large numbers of the Transvaal Boers will hold out to the very last; that even after their capital is taken they will carry on a guerilla war in the mountainous country to the northeast of Pretoria; that they will make desperate efforts to conquer southern Rhodesia, and even to cross the Zambesi; and, failing that, that they will endeavor to find a way of escape through the Bechuanaland Protectorate into German or Portuguese territory. I sincerely hope that I may prove to be mistaken in this estimate of the probable action of the Transvaal Boers. When the right moment comes, no efforts should be spared to induce them to accept the position of British subjects on terms which, in due time, will secure to them not only freedom and justice, but adequate representation and responsible government;

but the history of past struggles between the English and the Dutch, and my own knowledge of the Boers' character, their intense love of liberty for themselves, with the right and power of domination over all others, their strong and deep religious faith, their ardent patriotism, their dogged tenacity, their courage in defensive warfare, their fatalism, their ignorance and their ferocity, all make me think that they will hold out stubbornly, at any rate so long as they can obtain supplies, contraband of war, and the aid of Continental mercenaries by way of Delagoa Bay and certain other points on the eastern seaboard.

The Franco-Dutch race in the Transvaal would prove an invaluable acquisition to the forces of the British Empire if their confidence and loyalty could be secured by fair means. How this most desirable consummation is to be reached is a question which would demand a long and elaborate answer. No more difficult problem could be submitted to any British statesman than how to secure the good will, respect and fidelity of the Transvaal Boers after the conquest of their territory. Unfortunately, we have still a long way to go before we can arrive at the point where we may hope even to begin the task of finding a satisfactory solution.

As regards the final results of the military operations, no loyal Englishman has ever entertained a moment's doubt. No matter what the cost and loss, the conquest of the Boer Republics must be achieved. The Republican Governments are bound to disappear, and the territories of the two States, together with Swaziland, will form part of Her Majesty's dominions. Any other settlement, any surrender or compromise which would leave a nucleus for future political intrigues in South Africa, or a fulcrum for any European Power hostile to England, would evoke a storm of indignation, an outburst of disgust and fury in this country and throughout the British Empire, that no English Ministry could possibly survive. It may be safely added that no conceivable Ministry in this country would seriously contemplate at the present day any such repetition of imbecility, in view of the increased knowledge of South African affairs now possessed by the British public. Throughout Great and Greater Britain the vast majority of men of all shades of political opinion are agreed on the policy which must be pursued, so far as the extinction of the Dutch Republics is concerned. The half-measures by which

the evil day might have been postponed before the Boer invasion of British territories are no longer possible, and it is well for the cause of freedom and civilization in South Africa that this is so. It is well that the heart of the Pharaoh of Pretoria was hardened at the right moment.

There are well-meaning people even in England who are still laboring under delusions with regard to the justice and necessity of our struggle against the forces of darkness in South Africa; but even they must see that the "Majuba Magnanimity" farce will not bear repetition. The very small minority of Pro-Boer or "Stop-the-War" fanatics in this country are a negligible quantity. Their theories are unsound. Their allegations of fact are based upon imagination. Their contentions will not bear argument. Their proposals, if acted upon, would involve the loss of South Africa and of all our other colonies, together with our Indian Empire. The greatest civilizing Power in the world, the most potent agency for diffusing the blessings of peace throughout the dark places of the earth, would be destroyed. Why these presumably sincere visionaries so persistently advocate a policy which, if pursued to its logical and inevitable conclusion, must ultimately leave the dismembered corpse of the British Empire for the vultures of the European Continent to gorge at leisure, they best know. Sane and sober-minded Englishmen, at home and in the colonies, are not prepared to perform the "happy despatch" at the bidding of these gentlemen.

Whatever the duration of the war, there must be a transitional period before the territories of the two Republics can be brought under a regular administration as part of Her Majesty's dominions. During the interregnum, martial law—which is only another name for the will of the commanding officer—must necessarily prevail throughout the disturbed districts and the conquered territories. Martial law under British officers is always administered with fairness, and justice is tempered with mercy. The aid of competent legal advisers whenever available is duly sought, and if in a hostile or unsettled country a British court-martial errs at all, it is usually on the side of undue leniency. The brutal methods and sanguinary sentences of French and German military tribunals are repugnant to the gentle and chivalrous British officer. Martial law in South Africa would not necessarily interfere with the action of the ordinary tribunals in civil cases

nor even in criminal cases between civilians; and a judicious commanding officer, of course, would take care to preserve as much of the existing machinery of government as he could consistently with allegiance to the Queen and a loyal acceptance of the new *régime*. The happy results of this policy are already to some extent manifest in the Orange territory. Even there, however, there are already signs that the English besetting error of undue generosity to the vanquished is bearing evil fruit.

The true medium between extreme severity and weak indulgence may at times be hard to find, but in the interests of order and good government the perpetrators of outrages against the rules of civilized warfare ought not to go unpunished, any more than sufferers for loyalty should go without due compensation. If this be true even in conquered territories, *à fortiori* it applies to the cases of those Dutch inhabitants of the Cape Colony and Natal who have risen in rebellion against Her Majesty's Government, and have raided, plundered and wrecked the property of their loyal neighbors. These men are absolutely without excuse, and should be dealt with as ordinary criminals on charges of treason, murder, theft, housebreaking, arson, or malicious injury to property, as the case may be; the possession of loot or stolen goods being in all cases sufficient proof of guilt.

It is obvious that trial by jury in the disturbed districts, or anywhere in the Cape Colony or Natal, would be a mere farce in the present state of public feeling throughout South Africa. Acquittal or condemnation would be a foregone conclusion in all cases, according as the jury happened to be pro-Boer or anti-Boer. Verdicts must be unanimous, and the ends of justice could always be frustrated, either by packing a jury or by taking care that one irreconcilable at least should be secured. Under the circumstances, the only safe and just course would be for the Imperial Government to appoint a judicial commission to try rebels without a jury, and also to take evidence and frame a report on all claims for compensation. Such a commission might be appointed with the sanction of an Imperial Act of Parliament if necessary, and might be proclaimed by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, with the concurrence of the Cape and Natal Ministries, respectively. If either the Bond Ministry at the Cape, or the Cape or Natal Supreme Courts, raised legal difficulties on constitutional grounds, such obstruction might,

I think, be got rid of by the proclamation of martial law throughout the Cape Colony and Natal, and this is a course which, under present circumstances, I should strongly recommend. It would remove many legal and technical difficulties, it would give confidence to the loyalists, and it would be a terror to evil-doers. The case of the loyal farmers of the Cape Colony and Natal, whose property has been destroyed in many instances by their disloyal neighbors, is a peculiarly hard one, and I cannot imagine a more unjust and suicidal policy for any Government to pursue than to leave these men and their families destitute, in order to gain a cheap reputation for magnanimity by letting rebels, murderers, burglars and thieves go off scot free. Rebels and robbers should in all cases be made to pay in purse or person or in both, as the case may be; and the excuse that in their innocence they were beguiled by Mr. Krüger's wicked emissaries ought not to be too lightly admitted. These men had no just cause of complaint against Her Majesty's Government, and even if, instead of having all the political power in their own hands and enjoying perfect liberty, they had had political grievances, they would still have been without excuse for availing themselves of a state of war in order to steal or destroy the goods of their next-door neighbors.

I should deprecate any idea of inflicting capital punishment for treason or rebellion in South Africa, though the Roman-Dutch Law, the common law of all South Africa, decrees the penalty of death in all such cases. In this, as in many other respects, the example set by Mr. Krüger himself furnishes useful lessons. Whatever his faults may be, it must be imputed to him for righteousness that, save in forcing on this war, he has not shown himself hitherto to be bloodthirsty. On the contrary, he has repeatedly restrained the truculence of his followers. When Dr. Jameson and the officers of his ill-starred expedition were confined in Pretoria gaol, one commandant after another urged the President to allow the burghers to drag the prisoners out into the square and put them to death. Mr. Krüger knew that they had surrendered on a promise that the lives of all the party should be spared, and he steadily refused to yield to very great pressure. Again, when the four leaders of the reform movement in Johannesburg were placed on their trial for high treason at Pretoria, before a "hanging" judge specially imported from Bloemfontein for the purpose, and after the prisoners had been denied

the benefit of the new treason law with its milder penalties, only intended for Transvaal burghers, and had been sentenced to death under the old Roman-Dutch Law as embodied in the Criminal Code of Philip II., Mr. Krüger in the last resort shrank from bloodguiltiness, and only screwed £100,000 out of the four prisoners by way of ransom instead of hanging them. Again, when the members of the Johannesburg Reform Committee had been sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor at Pretoria, Mr. Krüger took ransom for them at the rate of £2,000 apiece. All this must, I say, be counted to him for righteousness, comparatively speaking. These cases afford an indication of the measures of punishment deemed adequate in cases of alleged treason, rebellion or sedition by the Dutch themselves, and might afford a useful guide to courts passing sentence on prisoners convicted of similar offenses in the Cape Colony and Natal.

On the other hand, though strictly just and legal, it might not be expedient to reduce a large number of Dutch families to indigence by a total confiscation of landed property or by excessive fines. The measure of punishment may be safely left to the discretion of the court, provided the court or judicial commission be above suspicion in respect of integrity and impartiality, and be empowered to sit with assessors, but without a jury.

With regard to compensation to be awarded to loyalists in respect of losses sustained during and in consequence of the war, much time, labor and patience will be required to frame a complete and satisfactory report on which Her Majesty's Government might rely. The damage done by the ignorant, malicious and semi-savage Boers up to date has been enormous, and we are not even near the end of the war yet. They seem to have taken a fiendish delight in blowing up bridges, wrecking railway lines, destroying telegraphs, houses and private property of all kinds, and generally in uprooting every trace of the civilization of which they are unworthy. Their deeds of vandalism recall the excesses of the *Commune* of Paris or the *sansculottes* of the French Revolution. Of course, the plea of military necessity may be urged in excuse for the destruction of bridges, railways and telegraphs; but gutting farmhouses, insulting women, killing children in women's laagers, or wantonly destroying the personal property of non-combatants, is not a military necessity any more than firing on a hospital or an ambulance, or committing murder under cover

of a white flag. Crime should be punished in war as in peace, and I see no reason why a criminal should escape the just penalty of his misdeeds merely because he happens to be a Dutchman. The due punishment of criminal offenses should therefore be one of the first cares of the Imperial authorities, both during the continuance and after the conclusion of hostilities, and no amnesty should be proclaimed until all wrongs have been redressed and all just claims satisfied.

The question of compensation is a wide one. In my opinion a clear distinction should be drawn between the infliction of punishment and the recovery of compensation. Where it can be shown that an offender has enriched himself by the plunder of loyalists, the penalty should include a fine sufficiently heavy to deprive him of all the benefit of his crime and of something more into the bargain. But the proceeds of all fines, whether derived from money paid or from the sale of land or other property, should be paid into a general fund to be applied to the compensation of loyal sufferers or to war expenses, at the discretion of Her Majesty's Government. The payment of compensation should, however, be independent of the recovery of any such fines or penalties. It is quite clear that the total value of all the property owned by the rebels, even if it were expedient to reduce them and their families to utter destitution, would not nearly suffice to make good the damage they have done, especially if the cost of bridges, railways and telegraphs destroyed were taken into account. The war is an Imperial war, waged for the salvation of the British Empire, as well as for the preservation of the South African Colonies, and it would be a grievous wrong if the loyalists who happened to be living at or near the scene of hostilities were to be reduced to penury through no fault of their own. It seems, then, certain that provision will have to be made in the first instance by the Imperial Government for the payment of compensation to loyalists for losses incurred through the war, though in the final adjustment of liabilities the loss must, as far as possible, be made to fall on those by whom it was occasioned. The British taxpayer may have to find the money in the first instance, but only as an advance to be ultimately refunded by the Transvaal and Orange territories. In strict justice, a certain portion of the debt should be made to fall on the members of the 'Afrikander Bond in the Cape Colony, and this might to some

extent be effected by leaving the Cape Government to make good all damage to their railways and telegraphs without assistance from the Imperial Government, and by debiting the Cape Government with the amount of all compensation to Cape loyalists, and crediting them with all fines recovered from Cape rebels.

The case of the Natal loyalists is peculiarly hard, and on every account Natal deserves exceptionally favorable consideration. There is no getting over the fact that the Bond Ministry of the Cape, while professing the lip-service of loyalty, allowed enormous stocks of warlike material to pass over the Cape railways into the Republics for the avowed purpose of making war against the British Government in the Cape Colony and Natal. There is no denying the notorious fact that the Bond Ministry studiously left places like Mafeking, Vryburg, Kimberley, De Aar and Naauwpoort absolutely undefended, and even refused to allow arms, troops and ammunition to be forwarded to Kimberley for defensive purposes, when they must have known that war was impending. It is impossible to deny that but for the De Beers Company at Kimberley and the British South Africa Company at Mafeking both those places must have fallen long ago. That they were enabled to hold out so long was no thanks to the Bond Ministry at Cape Town; nor is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the final success of the Boers in their efforts to drive the English out of South Africa would have rejoiced the hearts of many in the Cape Colony besides the members of the Afrikaner Bond.

In Natal, on the other hand, the attitude of the Government and of the entire people, with the exception of the Dutch rebels in the north, left nothing to be desired. As regards gallantry in the field, honors are divided between the loyalists of the Cape Colony and those of Natal. Both have done splendid service to the Empire; but in the final settlement after the conclusion of hostilities Natal will, as already observed, be entitled to special consideration on many accounts.

In the number of the *Nineteenth Century* for last December, under the heading "South African Problems and Lessons," I stated very briefly the principal points of such a final settlement as I would recommend after the war, and in the main I still adhere to the views and opinions which I then expressed. Much water has flowed under the bridges since that time. The magni-

tude of the task before the British army has been better realized by the public, though I doubt whether it is even yet sufficiently grasped by those who have never seen South Africa. However prolonged the struggle, however terrible the losses still to be endured, there can be no turning back. The reactionary forces of barbarism, even though backed by all the swashbucklers of the European Continent, must be subdued. England must win this fight or relinquish her foremost place in the vanguard of civilization. She must save South Africa or lose her Empire. And loss of Empire would mean for us starvation. The teeming millions in these little islands of the North Sea could not even be fed, were we to lose the command of the ocean and the possession of our colonies. For the Boers of South Africa, the struggle is one partly of sentiment and partly of love of dominating and tyrannizing over others. For us it is a question of life or death, and we shall act accordingly. Altruism is all very well in private life as an exhibition of Christian virtue, but in struggles for existence between States, in what is called the higher politics, enlightened selfishness is and must be the only true guide. A statesman's first duty is to safeguard the interests of his own country, and if this cannot be done without hurting the feelings of others, *tant pis pour les autres*. Boer sentiment within the limits of right and justice toward others is no doubt entitled to respect, but when the Boer turns housebreaker it is time to provide him with handcuffs. We cannot afford to let him turn us out of our own house, neither can we leave him at liberty to summon other housebreakers to his aid. The lesson of self-preservation as the supreme political duty has been taught us by our friends, the Germans, and it shall go hard but we will better the instruction. Our first care must always be to keep our navy in a state of perfect efficiency, able at any time to vanquish the strongest combination of hostile navies likely to be brought against us; and if in view of the increase of the navies of Russia, Germany and France it becomes necessary for us to double or treble our present naval force, we must double it or treble it, as the case may be. The life of the British Empire depends on its navy. As regards the army, this war has taught us invaluable lessons. We know now that for us conscription is as unnecessary as it would be detrimental to our manufacturing and mercantile interests. All we need to do is to keep up a standing army for the colonies and India, with all the requisites for

mobility and offensive action; while for the defense of the Empire otherwise we need only see to it that our boys shall be well drilled and instructed in all manly and warlike exercises, especially riding and rifle-shooting. They will spring to arms fast enough when the motherland is threatened. Our soldiers are all volunteers, and we now know what boundless resources we possess in our colonies and what manner of men are the sons of Britain across the seas. One effect of this war will be to make the Anglo-Saxons the greatest military Power in the world, while strengthening their command of the seas.

Whatever form of government be introduced at first into the conquered territories of the Transvaal and the Orange districts, it is certain that a considerable military force must be kept there for some time. The pacification of a country torn by what is, from some points of view, almost a civil war can only be effected by force and by a gradual process. I am much mistaken if our troops will be enabled to leave South Africa in so short a time as many people in England seem to fancy. The work of administration will become impossible unless supported by forces strong enough to prevent, or at any rate punish, any future attempts at insurrection. The object to be kept in view should be the substitution of Colonial for Imperial troops as soon as possible. A large proportion of the Canadian, Australasian and other volunteer forces will, in all probability, elect to settle permanently in South Africa, and any such wish or intention on their part should be cordially welcomed and encouraged in every possible way by Her Majesty's Government, and also by the British South Africa Company. Land grants should be made to them on the most favorable terms, and every facility should be afforded to enable them to prospect for minerals, in addition to engaging in agricultural and pastoral pursuits. The climate is perfect, the wealth of the country is still unknown, notwithstanding the millions already extracted from the diamond and gold mines hitherto opened. The Transvaal and Rhodesia possess undeveloped mineral wealth as yet undreamed of, save by the few who know those countries well and keep their knowledge to themselves. The influx of these splendid young colonists who are now fighting under the British flag will be a blessing to South Africa and a gain to the whole Empire. If they can be induced to settle in sufficient numbers in South Africa, they will in time change the whole face of the

country. They will completely redress the political balance by counteracting the preponderance of the Boer vote, and they will introduce enlightenment, reform and fresh energy into every department of the State and every branch of social life. In time they may even civilize the Boers to some extent. Arrangements ought to be made to enable them to bring out to South Africa any members of their families who might be willing to join them; and even apart from this, committees of ladies should be formed in England and elsewhere, in conjunction with religious bodies of various denominations, for the purpose of sending out, under safe escort and to the care of reliable guardians, as many well-educated young ladies of British birth as might care to go out, after a preliminary training in nursing the sick, teaching, cooking, sewing or such other arts of domestic economy as might be found necessary. All arrangements for their safety and comfort could be made by local committees, and in the event of their getting married others might doubtless be found to take their places from time to time. In this way a sure foundation might be laid for a race of colonists in South Africa second to none in the world. The number of girls who remain unmarried and without sufficient objects in life in England is appalling, and I would beg to commend this suggestion to the serious consideration of philanthropic ladies who take a sincere interest in the welfare and happiness of their sex, and at the same time are willing to promote emigration in its best form.

I may here briefly recapitulate the principal points in such a settlement as I would recommend on the conclusion of hostilities, bearing in mind the duty of dealing justly both by the loyal Colonists of the Cape Colony and Natal and also by the Boers, the necessity of rendering impossible any repetition of attempts at a Boer conquest of South Africa with foreign aid, and the desirability of conciliating our Dutch fellow-subjects by all fair means and gradually reconciling them to their lot as British citizens.

With regard to territorial limits, I am of opinion that the best plan would be to establish in Southeastern Africa one great colony, to be called Natal, comprising Swaziland, the Transvaal and the Orange territory. If the necessary understanding could be arrived at with the Cape Colony, Griqualand East and Pondoland should be added to Natal, the St. John's or Umzimvubu River to be the boundary.

No effort should in my opinion be made to force on a federation of the South African Colonies. Federation, if it comes, must be spontaneous; but, as regards the rich southeastern portion of South Africa, Her Majesty's Government will have, when the war is over, such an opportunity as seldom occurs in the history of any Empire or any people. They will have *tabula rasa, carte blanche*, a sort of virgin page on which to write what they will. It is indeed a golden opportunity, and on the use made of it may depend not only the destiny of South Africa, but the fate of the British Empire.

The advantages of uniting the present colony of Natal and the Transvaal and Orange territory in one great colony would, I think, be very great. It would have an excellent seaboard. It would be a fair political and commercial counterpoise to the Cape Colony. An appeal court for all South Africa below the Zambesi might at once be established at Cape Town, with rights of ultimate appeal to the Privy Council. The Cape University system might be extended over all South Africa. The postal and telegraph systems would be uniform and could be worked from one centre. Due provision would be made, of course, for extradition and for the reciprocal enforcement of legal process. Union as between the great Eastern and Western Colonies for defensive purposes could be easily arranged. The laws of Natal and of the two extinct Republics would have to be examined and compared, and a law commission should be appointed to draft a series of consolidating enactments applicable to the entire territory. These enactments, of course, would have to be submitted to the present Natal Legislature, whose consent would be a condition precedent to any such arrangement; but, as regards the conquered territories, legislation should be by proclamation, pending the establishment of a limited form of representative government. Full parliamentary institutions with responsible government could not be safely introduced until all danger of disturbances shall have been finally removed. The task of simplifying, assimilating and consolidating the laws would not be so difficult in reality as would seem likely at first sight. The Roman-Dutch Law is the common law of all South Africa. Special laws where necessary could be expressly limited to certain localities. Mercantile laws could be assimilated as far as possible to those of England, as has been done in the Cape Colony. Mining laws could be so drawn as to

be applicable to the whole territory. The criminal law would in the main be similar to that of the Cape Colony, which is a not infelicitous mixture of Roman-Dutch and English law. English would be the official language, but all laws and proclamations would have to be published in Dutch as well as English, and due provision would have to be made for interpretation in all courts of justice. The language question would present no insuperable difficulties, as most officials in South Africa understand both languages; and in any sound educational system to be hereafter introduced into the Transvaal and Orange districts, the teaching of English should be made a condition *sine quâ non* in all cases in which a Government grant in aid might be applied for.

As regards the choice of a new capital, I should be inclined to suggest the formation of a new city in a high and healthy situation as near the western side of the Drakensberg as possible; but if that be thought too great an undertaking the best existing position would, on the whole, be Johannesburg.

Municipalities for large towns and village management boards for small ones should be established as soon as possible.

Monopolies should be abolished without compensation. Free trade should be adopted. There are no manufactures or industries worth protecting. All customs dues for revenue purposes would be levied at the coast, as at present in the Cape Colony. Inland custom houses would not be required. An excise should be imposed and rigorously enforced. Equal rights should be secured to all white men; equal justice for all men, white or black.

The supply of liquor to natives should be absolutely prohibited. As regards land, the South African system of registration of title and government survey is perfect. Land commissions could be appointed, of course, wherever necessary.

There is a wide difference between the late actual administration of government in the Orange Free State and that in the Transvaal. In the Orange territory, the late government may be described as honest, fair and even liberal. It would therefore be desirable to make as few changes as possible in that part of the country; the oath of allegiance being required, of course, from all officials. A firm, just and conciliatory policy, steadily pursued with due regard and consideration for the natural feelings and sentiments of the respectable inhabitants of the Orange dis-

tricts, and the prospect of representative institutions, and, ultimately, of responsible government will do much to reconcile all but the hopelessly irreconcilable to a change which, after all, will prove to them a blessing in disguise. Leniency, however, must not be carried too far at first. No crimes or offenses should be condoned, and the rights of all claimants for compensation should be duly considered and strictly enforced. In a conquered territory there is no danger that British officers will show excessive severity. It is quite the other way. Much harm may be, and often is, done by mistaken kindness. Justice should in all cases come before generosity.

In the Transvaal many drastic changes will be necessary which it is needless for me to specify in detail. The Uitlanders' legitimate grievances will need prompt and complete redress, and the whole Augean stable of corruption will have to be swept out with an unsparing hand. Indeed, the reforms needed may be summarized briefly as the substitution in the government of the country of honesty for dishonesty, of purity for corruption, of justice for injustice, and of freedom for slavery.

As regards that weightiest of questions, the financial settlement—the crucial test of all sound government—it may be necessary for Great Britain to provide cash in the first instance; but, as already remarked, the burden must be made to fall in due course on the two extinct republics, and especially on the Transvaal. That this will heavily tax the resources of the Transvaal is certain. The gold-mining industry in particular will have to a great extent to meet the cost of striking off its shackles, but it is well able to support it. English shareholders will probably face their liabilities under the circumstances with resignation. The foreign shareholders who are so largely interested in Transvaal gold mines will grumble; but they can hardly expect much sympathy from us. The almost universal Anglophobia on the European Continent throughout the present war has occasioned equal surprise and regret in England. Our foreign foes rejoice at our misfortunes, minimize our successes and exhaust their extensive vocabularies of vituperation in writing and speaking about us. Their malice is only surpassed by their ignorance of the real merits of the case they so glibly discuss. If their support of the Boers should culminate in pecuniary loss to themselves, they will have no right to blame us for the result.

England is in the proud position of needing no foreign alliance. She fears no foe, no combination of foes. Her own sons can protect her. Her fixed policy is to avoid the entanglements of any alliance with foreign States. Englishmen well know who are their real enemies and what their relative strength is. Not even with the United States of America will Great Britain ever seek alliance; but the British value the sympathy and appreciation of their kinsmen across the Atlantic far more than the good opinion of all other nations put together. The moral support of American citizens of British descent is most highly esteemed in England by all classes. The present deplorable struggle in South Africa, in which so many of England's best and bravest have already perished, is the war of freedom, justice and equality before the law, against the powers of darkness, and we feel sure that the verdict of enlightened American citizens will be as just and impartial as the future judgment of history.

SIDNEY SHIPPARD.